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Can Counter-Terrorist Internment Ever 
be Legitimate?
Fiona de Londras*
ABSTRACT
Counter-terrorist internment is generally rejected as illegitimate from a 
human rights perspective. However, while the practice of counter-terrorist 
internment has long resulted in the infringement of human rights, this 
article argues that the concept of internment holds some potential for 
legitimacy. This potential can only be realized if four legitimacy factors 
are fully embraced and complied with: public justificatory deliberation, 
non-discrimination, meaningful review, and effective temporal limitation. 
Outlining these factors, this article imagines a system of internment that 
is legitimate from a human rights perspective and can serve both real and 
pressing security needs, and rights-based legitimacy needs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Detention without trial, also termed “internment,”1 has long been used by 
governments faced with what is perceived to be a grave threat to national 
*   Fiona de Londras BCL, LL.M, Ph.D. (NUI). Lecturer, UCD School of Law, Dublin. fiona.
delondras@ucd.ie.
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tion in the War on Terror at the Department of International Relations, LSE. It was also later 
presented as a research seminar in NUI Maynooth and at the University of Copenhagen. 
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themes therein although, of course, all of the usual disclaimers apply.
  1. It is now common to use the phrase “preventive detention” in place of “internment,” 
perhaps because of the militaristic and intuitively negative connotations that the word 
“internment” conjures up. The term “internment” is used in this article in a deliberately 
provocative way in order to mount as firm a challenge as may be to the concept of 
marrying “legitimacy” with “internment.” For a brief overview of terminology in this
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security,2 such as terrorism.3 From Ireland and Northern Ireland, Turkey, 
Pakistan, and the United Kingdom to Guantánamo Bay and CIA “black 
sites” in Europe, internment has both been employed as a national defense 
mechanism and aroused enormous controversy. It is controversial not only 
because it deprives internees of liberty, but because that deprivation occurs 
in the absence of a charge, trial, or conviction for any criminal wrongdoing, 
reflecting the sharp end of the well-documented contemporary movement 
toward law and policy-making based on risk and uncertainty rather than 
guilt.4 In addition, detention without trial is widely seen as strategically 
misguided—as a tactic that gives rise to “backlash” in the form of alienation, 
radicalization, and resultant increases in terrorist activity.5 It holds, as David 
Lowry wrote, “the potentiality for moral corruption and arbitrariness” against 
which scholars and commentators must exercise caution.6 Such criticisms are 
both accurate and deserved when directed toward the systems of detention 
without trial employed by the United States (and to a lesser degree, by the 
United Kingdom) in the War on Terrorism and, indeed, in other contexts 
such as “the Troubles” in Northern Ireland. The aim of this article, however, 
   respect see, e.g., CLAIRE MACKEN, COUNTER-TERRORISM AND THE DETENTION OF SUSPECTED TERROR-
ISTS: PREVENTIVE DETENTION AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 5-6 (2011).
  2. See, e.g., THE INTERNMENT OF ALIENS IN TWENTIETH CENTURY BRITAIN (David Cesarani & Tony 
Kushner eds.,1993); ‘TOTALLY UN-ENGLISH?’ BRITAIN’S INTERNMENT OF ‘ENEMY ALIENS’ IN TWO WORLD 
WARS (Richard Dove ed., 2005); NATSU TAYLOR SAITO, FROM CHINESE EXCLUSION TO GUANTÁNAMO 
BAY: PLENARY POWER AND THE PREROGATIVE STATE (2007); CATE ELKNER, ILMA MARTINUZZI O’BRIEN, 
GAETANO RANDO & ANTHONY CAPPELLO, ENEMY ALIENS: THE INTERNMENT OF ITALIAN MIGRANTS IN AUSTRALIA 
DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR (2005); KIERAN MCEVOY, PARAMILITARY IMPRISONMENT IN NORTHERN 
IRELAND: RESISTANCE, MANAGEMENT AND RELEASE 204-226 (2001); ENEMIES WITHIN: ITALIAN AND OTHER 
INTERNEES IN CANADA AND ABROAD (Franca Iacovetta, Roberto Perin & Angelo Principe eds., 
2000); Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Administrative Detention in Israel and Its Employment 
as a Means of Combating Political Extremism, 9 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1 (1996).
  3. Of course, “terrorism” is a contested term that has so far defied definition in international 
law. In this article, however, the term should be taken to mean non-state actor violence 
directed toward civilians and intended to bring about particular state responses. See, 
e.g., Jack P. Gibbs, Conceptualization of Terrorism, 54 AM. SOC. REV. 329 (1989), for a 
useful analysis of definitional quandaries in this respect.
  4. Lucia Zedner, Fixing the Future? The Pre-Emptive Turn in Criminal Justice, in REGULATING 
DEVIANCE: THE REDIRECTION OF CRIMINALISATION AND THE FUTURES OF CRIMINAL LAW 35 (Bernadette 
McSherry, Alan Norrie & Simon Bronnit, eds., 2009).
  5. See Martha Crenshaw, The Causes of Terrorism, 13 COMP. POL. 379 (1981); Clark Mc-
Cauley, Jujitsu Politics: Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, in COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA’S WAR ON TERRORISM 45 (Paul Kimmel & Chris Stout 
eds., 2006); Fionnuala Ni Aoláin & Oren Gross, A Skeptical View of Deference to the 
Executive in Times of Crisis, 41 ISR. L. REV. 545, 554–55 (2008); Gary Lafree, Laura Dugan 
& Raven Korte, The Impact of British Counterterrorist Strategies on Political Violence 
in Northern Ireland: Comparing Deterrence and Backlash Models, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 17 
(2009).
  6. David R. Lowry, Internment: Detention Without Trial in Northern Ireland, 5 HUM. RTS. 
261, 262 (1975). Adam Tomkins has described internment as “among the most serious 
measures emergency legislation can enact.” Adam Tomkins, Legislating Against Terror: 
The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, P. L., 2002, at 205, 213.
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is to question whether these criticisms are justified in relation to detention 
without charge per se or whether, in contrast, the extent to which these 
criticisms can justifiably be levied depends on how a system of detention 
without charge or trial is designed and implemented. The article argues that, 
at least at the level of theory, it may be possible to design and implement 
a legitimate system of internment.
The aim of this article is not to question the proposition that such a sys-
tem ought to be introduced only where there is, in fact, an emergency that 
threatens the life of the nation or that such an emergency and the need for 
detention without charge or trial ought to be made out as a factual case and 
subjected to scrutiny by both political and judicial bodies. This proposition, 
drawn quite explicitly from international human rights law,7 is accepted as a 
prerequisite to the introduction of detention without trial. In fact, as further 
elaborated on below, limiting this tactic to such truly exceptional situations 
is an important factor in establishing legitimacy within the model being 
proposed. The elaboration of a proposed model within which internment 
might have some legitimacy, while discomforting, is motivated by a belief 
that as human rights scholars who aim to influence national defense policy 
from a rights-based perspective, we ought to extend our analysis beyond 
the prima facie objectionability of internment as a counter-terrorist strategy 
and consider whether it could be designed and implemented in a fashion 
that is legitimate and proportionate. Bearing this in mind, this article argues 
that detention without trial is not an illegitimate counter-terrorist tool per se; 
rather, a legitimate system of detention without trial might be possible if four 
legitimacy requirements are adhered to. This article identifies these “legiti-
macy factors” as: 1) public justificatory deliberation, 2) non-discrimination, 
3) meaningful review, and 4) effective temporal limitation. 
As an important starting point, a model of this kind requires us to reject 
the dichotomous presentation of security and human rights that has emerged 
in some literature in the wake of the attacks of 11 September 20018 and to 
  7. This is based on the derogations regimes found within the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 
21st Sess., art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 
Mar. 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 Nov. 1950, art. 15, 213 U.N.T.S. 
221, Europ. T.S. No. 5 (entered into force 3 Sept. 1953). It should be noted, however, 
that the treaty enforcing bodies in international law, and especially the European Court 
of Human Rights, have not generally been particularly rigorous in their consideration 
of whether a state is actually experiencing a state of emergency and especially whether 
a detention without trial regime introduced on foot of a derogation is proportionate 
and compliant with the particular human rights regime. Fiona de Londras, The Right to 
Challenge the Lawfulness of Detention: An International Perspective on US Detention 
of Suspected Terrorists, 12 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 223, 247–55 (2007).
  8. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, for example, conceptualize liberty and security as 
existing on a Pareto Frontier within which a reduction in one results in an increase
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recognize instead the capacity (and at times the need) for the proportion-
ate and rights-compliant infringement of some individual liberties in the 
interests of security, although there are some liberties (such as the right to 
be free from torture) that can never be infringed upon in any circumstances. 
The human rights framework as it currently exists allows for states to take 
security-motivated action without disproportionately repressive violations of 
individual rights.9 Indeed, international human rights law and its system of 
derogations in times of emergency are expressly designed to facilitate such 
an approach.10 This is often referred to as a “balancing” approach to security 
and rights. The language of balancing is problematic because it does not 
fully capture this kind of co-existence between rights and security.11 A bal-
ancing approach suggests that every thing and every right is “up for grabs,” 
whereas recognizing co-existence between rights and security reminds us that 
there are limits to both individual rights and security-motivated state action. 
However, the language of balancing can be useful when employed within 
a framework that rejects dichotomous constructs and is used in that context 
in this piece. This article argues that a process-based approach to detention 
without trial that is built around the architecture of international human 
rights law and infused with principles of the rule of law and democracy is 
possible. An approach of this kind allows us to acknowledge that detaining 
people without charge or trial will sometimes be a necessary measure where 
there is a serious threat to the security of the state and where that threat is 
deeply embedded into civilian society (i.e. where there is no conventional 
situation of “armed conflict”) but that this need not mean the rejection of 
individual rights or state engagement in illegitimate action.
   in the other. ERIC POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY AND THE 
COURTS 12 (2007).
  9. This cannot be done, of course, in relation to absolute rights such as, for example, the 
right to be free from torture under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Saadi v. Italy App. No. 37201/06, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 30 (2008)), but it can be 
done in relation to rights that are capable of limitation. This is possible even without 
derogation where the margin of appreciation, and the limitation clauses of rights them-
selves (including references to those actions “necessary in a democratic society” found 
throughout the European Convention on Human Rights) provided actions taken are 
themselves proportionate and objectively justifiable. For analysis see Stefan Kirchner, 
Human Rights Guarantees during States of Emergency: The European Convention on 
Human Rights, 3 BALTIC J. L. & POL. 1 (2010).
 10. JOAN FITZPATRICK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRISIS: THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM FOR PROTECTING RIGHTS DURING 
STATES OF EMERGENCY 36 (1994).
 11. Id. at 57–64. See also Oren Gross, Security vs. Liberty: An Imbalanced Balancing 
(Minn. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-42, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1471634 (exploring in depth the challenges of balancing as a judicial mecha-
nism in counter-terrorist crises with particular attention on biases and heuristic devices 
that may skew the analysis in this context).
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II. LEGITIMACY AND THE RULE OF LAW
Any model of a legitimate system of detention without trial must first of all 
grapple with the concept of legitimacy. This article argues that legitimacy 
is bound up with the rule of law in its broad sense—in other words, that a 
system derives its legitimacy from its compliance with the basic tenets of the 
rule of law. Thus, although the proposed model of detention without trial is 
very much a process-based one, this does not mean that it is based only on 
a narrow conception of the rule of law. Rather, because the processes that 
this article identifies as necessary for the establishment of legitimacy run 
across all of the main public functions of the state (executive, legislative, 
judicial, administrative, and law-enforcement), they are tightly tethered to 
broad conceptions of the rule of law. Thus, the model recognizes that for 
any internment to be legitimate, all of the elements of the state that are 
involved in the creation, implementation, and administration of a system 
of detention without trial must act in a manner that is compliant with the 
rule of law and that gives individual detainees the opportunity to launch 
an effective challenge to their detention. As Imelda Maher has expressed in 
a different context, it reflects the fact that compliance with the rule of law 
can both constrain and legitimate the exercise of public power.12 
Over time our conceptions of the rule of law have broadened and 
deepened, largely due to increasing democratic participation, transnational 
and international cooperation and institution-building, the development of 
regional and international standard-setting organizations, and treaties and 
enforcement mechanisms (particularly in the context of human rights). Thus, 
rather than refer solely to the “rule of law” simpliciter, we now find ourselves 
concerned with the democratic rule of law,13 the international rule of law,14 
broad rule of law,15 narrow rule of law,16 Asian perspectives on the rule of 
law,17 and more.18 To all of these conceptions of the rule of law, however, 
the concept of legitimacy is fundamental. For narrow rule of law scholars, 
 12. Imelda Maher, Functional and Normative Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions: 
The Case of the European Competition Network, 7 COMP. EUR. POL. 414, 419 (2009).
 13. Guillermo O’Donnell, Why The Rule of Law Matters, 4 J. DEMOCRACY 32 (2004).
 14. Mattias Kumm, International Law in National Courts: The International Rule of Law and 
the Limits of the Internationalist Model, 44 VA. J. INT’L. L. 19 (2003).
 15. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 93–94 (1986); PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW (1997).
 16. F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, 
93 LAW Q. REV. 195 (1977).
 17. ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW: THEORIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RULE OF LAW IN TWELVE ASIAN 
COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE U.S. (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004).
 18. For an in-depth consideration of the rule of law, its history and its meaning, see BRIAN 
Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY (2004). For a contemporary, 
reflective, and holistic perspective on judicial conceptualizations of the rule of law, 
including the role of rights-protection within it, see TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW (2010).
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legitimacy is connected with the concept of lawfulness.19 By contrast, broad 
rule of law scholars see legitimacy as a more textured concept.20 Following 
this approach, in the context of this article the suggestion that legitimacy 
and lawfulness are coterminous is denied: there are too many examples of 
detention without trial and internment systems having been lawful but not 
legitimate.21 Rather, any attempt to create a legitimate counter-terrorist strat-
egy must engage the complex factors that feed into the notion of legitimacy. 
These factors ensure that we are governed by reference to constitutionalist 
conceptions of the rule of law, rather than rule by law.
To propound what this article terms a “process-based system of 
detention without trial” is perhaps to advocate a prima facie “narrow” 
model of the rule of law, but the depth and breadth of that process re-
futes this label. What Jonathan Rose calls a “narrow” rule of law22 and 
George Fletcher describes as a “modest version” of the rule of law23 is es-
sentially based on the notion of governing by reference to rules and process 
without necessarily taking into account the legitimacy, justice, fairness, or 
rigor of those rules or processes. While proponents of the narrow rule of law 
argue that these rules and processes are generally to be focused on “on the 
prevention of arbitrary governmental action and the protection of individual 
rights,”24 the narrow rule of law construct is not focused on whether or not—
from the perspective of (the admittedly ambiguous notion) of justice—the law 
by which the state is to be ruled is “good.”25 In contrast, the “broad” concep-
tion of the rule of law (or what Fletcher describes as “a more lofty ideal that 
incorporates criteria of justice,”26) is concerned not only with ensuring that 
laws are created and administered by means of a legitimate process but also 
that their content is itself in keeping with fundamental principles of liberal 
democracy.27 In other words, rather than claiming that adhering to proper 
 19. See, e.g., Robert Summers, A Formal Theory of the Rule of Law, 6 RATIO JURIS 127-41 
(1993).
 20. See, e.g,. PAUL KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW 1-100 (1997).
 21. By means of example, internment in Northern Ireland was created by legislation, (Civil 
Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922), as was internment in Ireland, 
(Offences against the State Act 1939 (Act No. 13/1939)), available at http://www.irish-
statutebook.ie/1939/en/act/pub/0013/index.html. Detention in Guantánamo Bay was 
initially done under the Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 
115 Stat. 224 (2001), which led to a Presidential Order entitled “Detention, Treatment 
and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War against Terrorism,” 66 F.R. 57833 (16 Nov. 
2001). The detention was subsequently reconstituted by the Detainee Treatment Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-163, 119 Stat. 3136, 3474 (2006).
 22. Jonathan Rose, The Rule of Law in the Western World: An Overview, 35 J. SOC. PHIL. 
457, 459 (2004).
 23. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 11 (1996).
 24. Rose, supra note 22, at 459.
 25. Rose, supra note 22, at 459–60.
 26. FLETCHER, supra note 23, at 11.
 27. DWORKIN, supra note 15, at 93–94.
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processes in the creation and administration of laws will protect individual 
rights,28 a broader conception of the rule of law requires us to ensure that 
both the formal processes and the substantive content of the law strike a 
balance between individual liberty and governmental power responsibly 
exercised. This view of the rule of law is perhaps most ambitiously expressed 
by Judith Shklar, who argues that conventional conceptions of the rule of 
law are insufficiently concerned with the content of the law and with the 
capacity of the rule of law as a foundational concept to control and limit 
governmental action, rather than as a means of providing a mandate to such 
action.29 For Shklar, the rule of law retains its usefulness only if we commit 
ourselves to seeing it “as an essential element of constitutional government 
generally and of representative democracy particularly” bearing in mind that 
our starting point must be “the fear of violence, the insecurity of arbitrary 
government, and the discriminations of injustice.”30
Thus, although process-based, the model of detention without trial that 
is mooted in this article does not fit well within the narrow conception of 
the rule of law. Rather its emphasis on legitimacy and non-arbitrary and 
non-discriminatory government action identifies it with a broader view of 
the rule of law. This is particularly so because of the focus on legitimacy 
within the model.
The role of process and procedure in bringing about legitimacy is widely 
recognized. Mark Thatcher and Alec Stone Sweet have turned their attention 
to procedural legitimacy in the context of delegated powers, where they 
argue that procedural legitimacy can be an effective alternative to the elec-
toral accountability that we rely on in relation to non-delegated powers.31 
Their argument is focused on outputs, such as the legitimacy of the result 
of a dispute, and they argue that where the process leading to the output 
has been a legitimate one, involved actors are more likely to accept and 
abide by it even if it is not the output that they had hoped to achieve.32 In 
contrast, Thomas Franck’s groundbreaking works The Power of Legitimacy 
Among Nations and Fairness in International Law and Institutions33 focused 
on input process legitimacy and on the methods of law and norm-creation. 
In the context of counter-terrorist action, legitimacy can perhaps be most 
usefully tethered to notions of constitutionalism in the Lockean sense of limit-
 28. ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (8th ed. 1915).
 29. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, POLITICAL THOUGHT AND POLITICAL THINKERS 21–37 (1998).
 30. Id. at 36.
 31. Mark Thatcher & Alec Stone Sweet, Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian 
Institutions, in THE POLITICS OF DELEGATION 1 (Mark Thatcher & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2003).
 32. Id.
 33. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990); THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIR-
NESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1998).
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ing a government in its exercise of powers.34 The sources of those limitations 
are not only written and unwritten constitutions but also constitutionalist 
values including respect for individual rights and proportionality of security-
motivated state action. These values, of course, are also embedded in broad 
rule of law theory. This means, to some extent at least, that legitimacy and 
the rule of law as understood within this piece have a connectivity (if not a 
circularity) that is important, for if a model of detention without trial can be 
designed that is legitimate, then its adherence to broad rule of law principles 
may be as closely assured as possible.
As an initial matter, however, it is important to address the “slippery 
slope” argument that might easily be made against the position advanced 
in this paper: namely, if internment can be made legitimate, so can other 
forms of rights infringement, such as torture, to which claims of necessity 
are made in times of terrorist emergency. The difference in essence lies in 
the nature of the right to liberty and the right to be free from torture. The law 
has long recognized that there is a difference between the natures of these 
rights.35 The right to liberty represents freedom from arbitrary deprivation 
of liberty. This right has always been formulated in a manner that recog-
nizes that some deprivations of liberty can be both necessary and justified 
although the liberty-depriver (i.e. the state) will be required to make out a 
justification for that limitation (by means, for example, of habeas corpus 
petitions). The right to be free from torture, on the other hand, is an absolute 
right. It is not a freedom from arbitrary torture, for example, but rather from 
all torturous actions, which are conceived of as actions that can never be 
justified, legitimated, or sanctioned in law. There is, therefore, a deontologi-
cal difference in our conceptualizations of these freedoms and rights that 
acts as an insurmountable obstacle to legitimatization of torture, even if a 
system of internment were to acquire legitimacy by means of employing a 
legitimating model as proposed.
 34. The difficulty in associating Lockean thought (narrow rule of law) with values-based 
constitutionalism and broad rule of law is not unacknowledged in this context. Indeed, 
these difficulties have been considered at length elsewhere. See, e.g., Lee Ward, Locke 
on Executive Power and Liberal Constitutionalism, 38 CAN. J. POL. SCIENCE 719 (2005). 
Notwithstanding these difficulties however, the concept of constitutionally limited power, 
which developed into constitutionalism, is connected with Lockean thought in its earlier 
stages, and it is in that context that this reference ought to be read.
 35. In international law, for example, the right to be free from torture is a jus cogens norm 
and it is subject to no limitation in the major human rights treaties, all of which protect 
it. See, e.g. JOHN T. PARRY, UNDERSTANDING TORTURE: LAW, VIOLENCE, AND POLITICAL IDENTITY, 15-43 
(2010). The right to liberty, on the other hand, is more accurately described as a right 
to be free from arbitrary deprivation of one’s liberty. See, e.g., CLAIRE MACKEN, COUNTER-
TERRORISM AND THE DETENTION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS: PREVENTIVE DETENTION AND INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 34-78 (2011). Thus, liberty is not considered absolute whereas freedom 
from torture is. 
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III. THE LEGITIMACY FACTORS
Human rights law has long associated justifiable limitations on the right to 
liberty with a lack of arbitrariness. Thus, within the human rights paradigm 
there is no prohibition on detention per se; rather the prohibition is on arbi-
trary detention.36 In order to avoid arbitrariness, two safeguards are required 
in all cases of detention (including detention that follows a criminal convic-
tion): first, that someone must fall within a limited list of bases for detention 
before the state is permitted to deprive them of their liberty; and second, 
that those within the detention of the state must enjoy adequate procedural 
safeguards including the right to challenge the lawfulness of the detention.37 
When it comes to detention without charge or trial of suspected terrorists, 
the two basic bulwarks against arbitrariness need to be supplemented with 
two further safeguards. Thus, the model proposed comprises four “legiti-
macy factors”: 1) public justificatory deliberation, 2) non-discrimination, 3) 
meaningful review of detention, and 4) temporal limitations. Where these 
legitimacy factors are fully embraced and applied it is likely that there would, 
in fact, be practically no cases of indefinite detention without charge or trial. 
Rather people would be released, charged, or tried within a timeframe that, 
while in all likelihood longer than that found in regular criminal processes, 
would be controlled and would result in the least infringement on individual 
liberty possible under the circumstances (with the level of that infringement 
being adjudicated upon as a general matter in the political system and as 
an individual matter in the judicial system).
Central to this article’s argument is the contention that periods of in-
ternment that have been unsuccessful as counter-terrorism measures have 
failed not because internment can never be a legitimate choice within the 
counter-terrorism toolkit, but rather because internment was not done in a 
legitimate manner and therefore resulted in backlash—in the escalation of 
the terrorist threat, the broadening of the support base for those deemed 
terrorist, and the drastic reduction in good relations between marginalized 
groups and the state. This is not to suggest that the limitation on rights it-
self cannot also be a basis of illegitimacy—it can, but it is not necessarily 
 36. NIHAL JAYAWICKRAMA, THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 375 (2002).
 37. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
supra note 7, at art. 5.; ICCPR, supra note 7, at art. 9; African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, art. 6, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5, 1520 
U.N.T.S. 217 (entered into force 21 Oct. 1986); American Declaration on the Rights 
and Duties of Man, arts. I, XXV, O.A.S. Res. XXX, signed 2 May 1948, O.A.S. Doc. 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.71, at 17 (1988); Commonweath of Independent States Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 10 (26 May 1995), available at http://
www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,CIS,,,49997ae32c,0.html.
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so. Where the limitation of rights takes place within a broader system that 
manifestly strives to ensure proportionality, limited infringements on rights, 
effective judicial review, even-handedness in the application of law, and so 
on, the limitation on rights can be legitimate because it takes place within a 
broader framework that is deeply concerned with and designed around rule 
of law principles. Where such limitation takes place without that surrounding 
framework, it lacks legitimacy and is seen as lacking legitimacy, thus result-
ing in backlash. This is especially the case where there is a (perceived or 
actual) victimization of a self-identified group of people within the broader 
community by the internment process. Internment in Northern Ireland pro-
vides us with an illustrative example of a case where internment might have 
been a justifiable national defense measure but was instead implemented 
in a manner that marked its illegitimacy and gave rise to counterproductive 
backlash and increased alienation of the Nationalist/Catholic population.
Although internment was used periodically on both sides of the border 
since the Partition of Ireland in 1921, internment in the 1970s is sufficient 
to illustrate the dangers of illegitimacy for our purposes.38 “Operation De-
metrius” (the program of internment in Northern Ireland between August of 
1971 and February of 1975) was originally introduced by then-Prime Minister 
of Northern Ireland Brian Faulkner in August 1971 under the Special Pow-
ers Act 1922.39 This followed the earlier decision by Faulkner to have the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary and Special Branch make up a list of those who 
ought to be interned.40 British military intelligence formed the preliminary 
view that the list was unreliable and advised against enacting internment, 
but Faulkner proceeded nonetheless.41 Although some civil rights leaders 
who were on the list received tip-offs in advance and were therefore not 
picked up in the initial sweep, 342 Catholic Nationalists and no Loyalists 
were picked up on the first morning of Operation Demetrius and taken to 
internment centers, including Crumlin Road Prison in Belfast and a makeshift 
internment camp in Long Kesh.42 The initial sweep resulted in immense 
violence, with seventeen people being killed in the day that Operation 
Demetrius began, including ten Catholics killed by British soldiers.43 The 
 38. On internment in Northern Ireland generally, see JOHN MCGUFFIN, INTERNMENT (1973), 
available at http://www.irishresistancebooks.com/internment/internment.htm; Brice 
Dickson, The Detention of Suspected Terrorists in Northern Ireland and Great Britain, 
43 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 927, 930–938 (2009).
 39. Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) (1922), available at http://cain.
ulst.ac.uk/hmso/spa1922.htm. For a concise account see DAVID BONNER, EXECUTIVE MEASURES, 
TERRORISM AND NATIONAL SECURITY: HAVE THE RULES OF THE GAME CHANGED? 87-91 (2007).
 40. See MCGUFFIN, supra note 38, at chapter 7.
 41. See id.
 42. Martin Melaugh, Internment—A Chronology of the Main Events, CAIN WEB SERVICE, 
available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/intern/chron.htm.
 43. Id.
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process of internment also led to the increased identification of Catholics 
with the IRA, to the civil rights march in Derry at which 14 civil rights 
activists were shot dead (known as Bloody Sunday), and to an enormous 
backlash against the British government. As a result, the British government 
was forced to put a stop to devolved government in Stormont and found 
itself before the European Court of Human Rights in relation to internment 
and to the “five techniques” used when interrogating some detainees.44 In 
the end, a total of 1,874 Catholics/Nationalists were interned, as were 107 
Protestants/Loyalists, with the first Protestants/Loyalists not being arrested 
until 2 February 1973.45 
There is little doubt that internment in Northern Ireland was an un-
mitigated disaster. In the words of Irish historian Tim Pat Coogan, it was 
“botched in practically every respect one can think of.”46 That does not mean 
that internment as a counter-terrorist tool was inevitably unjustifiable in the 
context of the Troubles. The difficulty was that it was designed, implemented, 
and administered in an apparently discriminatory,47 seemingly endless, non-
deliberative, and brutal manner.48 Moreover, it was nearly impossible49 to 
mount an effective challenge to one’s detention.50 Internment in Northern 
 44. Case of Ireland v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 5310-71, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) 
(1976). 
 45. Melaugh, supra note 42.
 46. TIM PAT COOGAN, THE TROUBLES: IRELAND’S ORDEAL 1966–1996 AND THE SEARCH FOR PEACE 149 
(2002).
 47. Although the power to detain without charge or trial was primarily applied to Catholic/
Nationalists, the European Court of Human Rights found that it was not discriminatory 
in The Republic of Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶¶ 225-232 
(1978). The rigor of that decision has justifiably been questioned in the literature, however 
for the purposes of a legitimacy analysis perceptions of discrimination may well be as 
important as proof thereof. As a result, I do not engage in an analysis of that decision 
here. For excellent analysis focusing on the extent to which the margin of appreciation 
doctrine was used in that (and other) case(s) to avoid answering “hard questions” of this 
nature, see Oren Gross & Fionnuala Ni Aolain, From Discretion to Scrutiny: Revisiting 
the Application of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of Article 15 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 625 (2001).
 48. Many of those who were detained were subjected to what were known as “the five 
techniques” of interrogation. The European Court of Human Rights declined to charac-
terize these as “torture” in The Republic of Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A) ¶167 (1978) but did find them to be inhuman and degrading treatment 
and therefore a breach of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 7, at art. 3.
 49. Dickson, supra note 38, at 932.
 50. Although at first glance it may appear that the challenge system put in place by the 
Detention of Terrorists (Northern Ireland) Order 1972 (involving an oral hearing before 
a Commissioner where a detention order (allowing for indefinite detention) was sought 
and permitting a detainee to request review of that order (when granted) by a Deten-
tion Appeals Commission) was quite rights-protecting, in reality it did not adhere to 
the basic tenets of international human rights law as we now understand them. Those 
international standards require that one can make a substantive challenge in adversarial 
hearings before a court or other court-like body with the power to order release within 
a reasonable time frame. Dickson, supra note 38 at 932–35.
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Ireland fanned the flames of violence primarily because it was illegitimate 
and did not adhere to rule of law principles. Whether a legitimate system 
of internment could have been designed in Northern Ireland in any circum-
stances is a difficult question, bearing in mind the widespread discrimination 
exercised on official levels against Catholic/Nationalist communities, the 
disputed authority of the state by those who regarded themselves as living 
in an occupied territory, and the Royal Ulster Constabulary’s abject lack of 
an even-handed and non-discriminatory approach to law enforcement.51 
All of these factors pointed towards a situation where, on a general level, 
a large portion of the population considered rule of law and legitimacy to 
be lacking, if not completely absent.52 Broader considerations of this kind 
inevitably feed into assessments of legitimacy, necessity, and appropriateness 
of internment as a counter-terrorist tool in any particular situation, but the 
purpose of this article is a generalized consideration of internment per se 
through the prism of four legitimacy factors.
A. Legitimacy Factor 1: Public Justificatory Deliberation
The first legitimacy factor is a requirement of public justificatory deliberation. 
This would oblige governments to engage with opposition parties, interna-
tional bodies, and civil society in order to justify the decision to bring in 
a system of detention without charge or trial. This builds on the idea that 
democracy and democratic governance require deliberation and that such 
deliberation ought to be public and as broad and inclusive as is plausible 
within a given set of circumstances. Deliberative democracy can be said to 
be organized around contestations of what constitutes the public good,53 a 
framework of discourse that is particularly apt where democracies are at-
tempting to confront terrorist crises without compromising their fundamental 
values. “Justificatory deliberation” simply means that the government, which 
is proposing a repressive measure such as internment, must engage in a de-
liberative process of justifying the measure by reference to its vision of the 
public good and what it requires. Because deliberation necessarily involves 
 51. DAVID SMITH & GERALD CHAMBERS, INEQUALITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1991). The scale of the actual 
discrimination against the Catholic/Nationalist community has sometimes been disputed, 
but the sense of grievance among the Catholic community that existed at the time was 
quite intense. See, e.g., Christopher Hewitt, Catholic Grievances, Catholic Nationalism 
and Violence in Northern Ireland During the Civil Rights Period: A Reconsideration, 32 
BRITISH J. SOC. 362 (1981). 
 52. For an overview of the differing degrees to which ideologically aligned members of the 
Northern Irish population (including Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist communities) considered 
the state to be legitimate in Northern Ireland, see, e.g., JOSEPH RUANE & JENNIFER TODD, THE 
DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND: POWER, CONFLICT AND EMANCIPATION 84-115 (2003).
 53. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 360–61 (1971).
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the possibility of being convinced by stronger arguments or viewpoints, 
justificatory deliberation cannot be merely an optical exercise but must 
instead be committed to and engaged in by a government that is willing to 
be convinced of a different pathway toward security.54 In a party-political 
system, and especially one where the executive and legislature are fused, 
such as the United Kingdom, this may require a shaking off of normal par-
liamentary structures such as vote-whipping. In the United Kingdom and 
similar parliamentary systems such as that in Ireland, whipping refers not 
only to counting votes but also to enforcing an obligation to vote on party-
political lines or to risk being expelled from the party.55 The strongest form 
of whip—the “three-line whip”—can be imposed on votes relating to matters 
such as the introduction of internment. This means that a majority party or 
coalition in Parliament can essentially guarantee success of its proposed 
legislation regardless of the strength of the justification or the quality of 
deliberation that has taken place.56 In order for justificatory deliberation to 
be effective from a legitimacy perspective, normal parliamentary processes 
may require some innovative system redesign such as giving over-weighted 
political power to minority parties in relation to such questions.57 Even if one 
is skeptical of the capacity for political processes to be effective gatekeepers 
for human rights in times of terroristic crisis,58 the process of deliberative 
justification in the political and popular arenas has a number of benefits 
that ought not to be discounted out of hand. 
First, there is the benefit from a democratic and rule of law perspective 
of subjecting government proposals to opposition parliamentary scrutiny, 
to international scrutiny where appropriate, and to public debate. It would 
require a government to make out a case that some measures beyond the 
 54. It is indisputable that, at present, Governments have a tendency toward what Lord Steyn 
has described as “playing politics in an area which cries out for an objective and non-
partisan approach”. Lord Steyn, Civil Liberties in Modern Britain, 2009 PUB. L. 228, 231.
 55. DUNCAN WATTS, A GLOSSARY OF UK GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 283–284 (2007).
 56. This is not to suggest that parliamentary dissent never happens; in fact, some political 
scientists argue that a new breed of independently minded voters may be creating an 
incentive towards dissent even in “Westminster” parliaments. CHRISTOPHER KAM, PARTY 
DISCIPLINE AND PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS (2009). However, in times of crisis dissent is less likely 
from backbenchers, majorities are more easily secured, and dissent can be countered 
by “bargaining” with opposition politicians for support on counter-terrorist proposals. 
Patterns of counter-terrorist parliamentary activity, and the impact thereon of the whip, 
are considered in Fiona de Londras & Fergal Davis, Controlling the Executive in Times 
of Terrorism: Competing Perspectives on Effective Oversight Mechanisms, 30 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 19, 34–35 (2010).
 57. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 2311, 2368–70 (2006).
 58. Fiona de Londras & Fergal Davis, Controlling the Executive in Times of Terrorism: 
Competing Perspectives on Effective Oversight Mechanisms, 30 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 
19, 34–38 (2010).
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ordinary are required59 and, moreover, that detention without charge or trial 
is necessary and justifiable. Then, the veracity of that case would be debated, 
dissected, and considered by politicians and commentators. It may not al-
ways change the end result and, in absence of systemic change to normal 
parliamentary processes in such votes, it may be that it would never do 
so. However, it might create an obligation on the government to engage in 
more than mere assertion and instead to commit to a process of persuasion 
and justification that, it is hoped, would catalyze reflection. Important also 
is the extent to which subjecting such proposals to a system of deliberative 
justification might have a positive design impact. In other words, flaws in 
the design as originally proposed, including flaws from a liberty and hu-
man rights perspective, might be “banged out,” so to speak, through such 
processes. Indeed, in the United Kingdom we have seen parliament—and 
particularly the House of Lords sitting as a parliamentary organ—having 
a very important function in bringing original proposals more closely into 
line with human rights imperatives (even if they have not always gone far 
enough in this direction).60 In summary, then, this first requirement—that 
of deliberative justification—brings benefits of democracy and design that 
are likely to result in a system that is more closely aligned to basic rule of 
law principles than would otherwise be the case. Therefore, deliberative 
justification accrues greater legitimacy than executive-design and imposition. 
Some might argue, however, that insisting upon justificatory delibera-
tion of counter-terrorist measures is simply inappropriate. Such an argument 
might take a number of forms. It could be said that such decisions are prop-
erly within the remit of the executive branch and ought not to be subject 
to parliamentary debate, discussion, design, or vote. This argument stands 
squarely within the “executive supremacy” school of thought of emergency 
powers and fails to take into account the tendency toward disproportion-
ate repression and state aggrandizement that frequently arises in times of 
security-related emergencies.61 Secondly it might be argued that engaging 
in a process of deliberative justification prior to the introduction of such a 
scheme would tip off those who are likely to be caught within the system 
and who might then flee. This argument certainly seems more persuasive but 
 59. This is particularly significant because even as courts are becoming more willing to 
question whether measures introduced in an emergency are proportionate, there is still 
a high level of deference to executive determinations of the existence of an emergency 
itself. Fiona de Londras, Guantánamo Bay: Towards Legality?, 71 MOD. L. REV. 36 (2007). 
This arises at both domestic and international levels. See, e.g., the decision of the House 
of Lords in A & Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, (2004) UKHL 56 
(H.L.) (but c.f. the judgment of Hoffman LJ in that case); A & Others v. United Kingdom, 
App. No. 3455/05, 49 Eur. H. R. Rep. 29 ¶ 109 (2009).
 60. Gavin Phillipson, Deference, Discretion, and Democracy in the Human Rights Act Era, 
60 CONTEMP. LEGAL PROBS. 40 (2007).
 61. de Londras & Davis, supra note 58, at 20–24.
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it is not at all strong enough to overcome the democracy and design argu-
ments in favor of deliberative justification, which are considered above. This 
is simply because there are ways to prevent potential targets from slipping 
through the net in advance of introducing such a system. For example, a 
list of potential detainees could be created and circulated to law enforce-
ment and border patrol officers who might then be on the lookout for any 
suspicious movements and empowered to subject such individuals to close 
surveillance. This may of course lead to privacy concerns. However, a privacy 
violation by law enforcement is less dangerous from a liberty perspective 
than a protracted period of detention without trial. In addition, safeguards 
can be put in place: for example, an in camera court might be required to 
adjudge whether there was sufficient suspicion prima facie to place indi-
viduals on such a “watch list” while the potential for a detention without 
charge or trial system was being debated and deliberated upon (although 
it would be important to ensure that no negative inferences undermining 
the presumption of innocence are drawn from deciding that someone is 
eligible for inclusion on such a watch list should a person be faced with 
criminal charges). The point here is not to make out all of the details of such 
a plan—indeed, there may well be serious flaws in the few points already 
suggested. The intention is merely to show that the obstacles that arguably 
arise from a law enforcement and security perspective of engaging in a 
deliberate process are not insurmountable. The benefits, on the other hand, 
are potentially considerable. 
B. Legitimacy Factor 2: Non-Discrimination
The second legitimacy factor is non-discrimination. Under this model, one 
ought not be subjected to detention without charge or trial on the basis of 
ascribed or acquired characteristics (such as race, religion, or nationality), 
and should only be detained after a thorough and non-prejudiced individual 
risk-assessment. Discriminatory internment is all too familiar in the counter-
terrorist context.62 It is important to note, however, that just because more 
people of a particular religion, race, or political affiliation are detained does 
not a priori make the detention regime discriminatory. It may well be that, 
in fact, more Nationalists than Loyalists posed a threat to security requir-
ing internment in Northern Ireland and that this justifies the discrepancy in 
numbers detained. However, the record shows that there was simply little 
or no interest in using internment powers against the Unionist community,63 
 62. Daniel Moeckli, The Selective “War on Terror”: Executive Detention of Foreign Nationals 
and the Principle of Non-Discrimination, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L LAW 495 (2006).
 63. COOGAN, supra note 46, at 150.
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particularly prior to the dissolution of the Northern Ireland parliament in 
March of 1972.64 Non-discrimination is not a numbers game; it reflects a 
much deeper and more fundamental commitment to equality and liberty 
than can be captured in a “counting” exercise. 
As experience in the United Kingdom shows, discrimination will typically 
either be built into a system of detention without charge or trial at the design 
stage, or will “creep” into such a system at the point of application. Part 4 
of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA) is an example 
of design-stage discrimination. This permitted the detention without charge 
or trial of those who were adjudged by the Home Secretary to be involved 
in or linked to terrorist activity.65 The Act limited these provisions to non-
UK-citizens,66 and no matter how dangerous UK citizens might have been, 
they could not be subjected to such a system.7 The House of Lords, in its 
important Belmarsh Case, found that this part of the ATCSA was incompat-
ible with the Human Rights Act 1998 and the ECHR largely because it was 
discriminatory—there was no basis for believing that the threat emanated 
only from non-UK-citizens.68 Indeed, as the tragic attack on the London 
transport system of July 2005 showed, there was in fact a serious threat from 
the United Kingdom’s own citizenry.69 Equally, even a system that is seem-
ingly neutral70 in its design can in fact be discriminatory in its application. 
Where risk assessments are colored by heuristic shortcuts such as racial 
profiling and assumptions of guilt-by-association, it is almost inevitable that 
security measures will be disproportionately applied to those who fit into 
 64. Health and Personal Social Services Order, 1972 No. 1265 (N.I. 14).
 65. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 [ATCSA], Part 4 (U.K.), available at http://
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/24/pdfs/ukpga_20010024_en.pdf. 
 66. Part 4, which included the detention power under § 23 of the ATCSA, dealt expressly 
with “Immigration and Asylum,” concerned “suspected international terrorists” (ATCSA, 
§ 21), and “the application of existing detention powers under the Immigration Act 
1971 (the “1971 Act”) to cases where the Secretary of State is seeking to remove a 
suspected international terrorist but where such removal is not currently possible.” 
Explanatory Notes, ¶ 72, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/24/
notes/division/1/1/4/4. 
 67. See id.
 68. A & Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2006) 2 AC 221. This deci-
sion has not been without its critics. See, e.g., David Campbell, The Threat of Terror 
and the Plausibility of Positivism, 2009 PUB. L. 501.
 69. The perpetrators of these attacks were British citizens. See ASSAF MOGHADAM, THE GLOBALIZA-
TION OF MARTYRDOM: AL QAEDA, SALAFI JIHAN, AND THE DIFFUSION OF SUICIDE ATTACKS 193-194 
(2008).
 70. Of course, various strands of critical legal thinking have convincingly and for a long 
time argued that the concept of “neutral” law is a myth and in fact that even seemingly 
generally phrased laws can impact upon certain categories of people in a dispropor-
tionate manner either through their application or by targeting behaviors, dress codes, 
arrangements of familial responsibility, types of violence, etc. that tend to occur in par-
ticular communities more than others. In particular, these arguments have been made 
by critical race theorists, feminist legal scholars, and critical law and religion scholars.
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the assumptive box; to the “Other.” This reflects the fact that, in a time of 
terrorist crisis, “[t]he dominance of belonging, sameness and security form a 
potent mixture catalysing lawmaking that primarily impacts on the rights of 
those who, through their faith, appearance, culture or behaviour fall outside 
of our vision of ‘us’ and into the vision of ‘the terrorist other.’”71 Although 
not an internment power, the operation of “stop and search” powers in the 
United Kingdom demonstrates the ways in which seemingly neutral counter-
terrorism laws can be operationalized in a discriminatory manner. Initially 
introduced in the early 1990s, but later amended and then contained in the 
Terrorism Act 2000, the police in the United Kingdom have long had the 
power to stop and search individuals at random in order to prevent acts of 
terrorism.72 Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 allows for areas to be placed 
under what is known as “s44” authorization if it is considered “expedient 
for the prevention of acts of terrorism” and, once such an authorization 
is in place, random stop and search operations can be done in that area 
without the need for a police officer to first have a reasonable suspicion that 
the person involved was engaged in terrorism.73 These powers, ultimately 
deemed incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights for 
a lack of effective safeguards,74 were generally impugned as being applied 
in a highly discriminatory manner particularly after 11 September 2001 and 
the subsequent London Underground attacks of 7 July 2005.75
Discriminatory systems of detention without charge or trial (regardless 
of whether the discrimination manifests itself at the design or the applica-
tion stage) are incredibly problematic from a legitimacy perspective. Not 
only do they severely undermine an important principle of the rule of law 
(equal application of the law), but they also erode a basic democratic com-
mitment to equal treatment that causes a disintegration of relations between 
the source of power (the state) and the target of that power (the members of 
the discriminatorily targeted group). Discriminatory internment, therefore, 
suffers a crisis of legitimacy that exacerbates the potential for backlash. In 
that way, it becomes a noose by which the state can hang itself: it makes 
internment ineffective as a counter-terrorist tool and undermines the demo-
cratic polity that the measures are purportedly designed to protect. It must, 
 71. de Londras & Davis, supra note 58, at 38.
 72. Terrorism Act 2000 (UK), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/
contents. On stop and search powers in the United Kingdom in overview, including 
but not limited to counter-terrorism stop and search, see HELEN FENWICK, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 1111-1139 (4th ed. 2007).
 73. Terrorism Act 2000, § 44 (UK).
 74. Gillan & Quinton v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 4158/05, 50 Eur. H.R. Rep. 45 
(2010).
 75. Kiron Reid, Race Issues and Stop and Search: Looking Behind the Statistics, 73 J. CRIM. 
LAW 165 (2009).
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however, also be acknowledged that the challenge of non-discrimination 
in counter-terrorism is a difficult one indeed, for even when a system is 
officially committed to non-discrimination, individual and collective po-
lice or security officers’ own biases and assumptions about the profile of a 
“terrorist” can play important overt and implicit roles in their identification 
of individuals for surveillance or investigation.76 This ultimately feeds into 
decisions about who is to be detained as a suspected terrorist especially in 
the relatively immediate aftermath of an attack when, as discussed in the 
next section, the burden for holding someone is likely to be lower. Thus, 
whether non-discrimination is, in fact, achievable is highly questionable 
and this legitimacy factor may well be the most difficult to achieve as a 
matter of practice.
C. Legitimacy Factor 3: Meaningful Review of Detention
The third requirement within this model is the meaningful review of deci-
sions to detain individuals without charge or trial. Meaningful review of 
the lawfulness of one’s detention plays an important role in a legitimacy 
analysis. It subjects the state to an oversight function that, if properly dis-
charged, ought to effectively protect individual detainees from protracted 
and unjustifiable detention while also ensuring that the basic constitutional-
ist principle of limited state power is upheld. In this respect, it plays both 
a rights-enforcing and a constitutionalist role. As Justice Kennedy noted in 
Boumediene v. Bush in the US Supreme Court (holding that Guantánamo Bay 
detainees had a constitutional right to habeas corpus), “[t]he writ of habeas 
corpus is itself an indispensable mechanism for monitoring the separation 
of powers. The test for determining the scope of this provision must not be 
subject to manipulation by those whose power it is designed to restrain.”77 
Meaningful review of detention decentralizes power from the executive and 
a (usually) compliant legislature and injects a voice that can focus on rule of 
law considerations without having to have one eye on pragmatic concerns 
such as re-election.78 In addition, ensuring that detainees have access to a 
meaningful review of the lawfulness of their detention may reduce the risk 
 76. On the effect of racial and religious bias on policing perceptions of terrorist threat see 
Deborah Newman & Nikki-Qui Brown, Historical Overview and Perceptions of Racial 
and Terrorist Profiling in an Era of Homeland Security: A Research Note, 20(3) CRIM. 
JUST. POL’Y REV. 359 (2009).
 77. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765–66 (2008).
 78. This is not to claim that judges are entirely non-political; merely that (usually) they do 
not have to worry about the impact their decisions would have on electoral popularity 
in the same way politicians may have to. 
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of torture or ill-treatment in detention, which could be reported to a court 
at that early review stage.79
This requirement could be met by ensuring that detainees have access to 
habeas corpus or to some system of review that fulfils the basic requirements 
recognized by international and domestic human rights law. In this respect 
we can identify four main elements: (a) access to a court, (b) access to in-
formation, (c) access to effective legal representation, and (d) a meaningful 
opportunity for release.80 A court in this context need not be a court in the 
normal sense of the word, but it should be an independent adjudicatory body 
that has all of the hallmarks of a court. It is not inconceivable that some-
thing like the Combatant Status Review Tribunals operating in Guantánamo 
Bay until recently81 could fulfill this requirement provided they abided by 
the principles of aforementioned court-focused liberty adjudications. That 
said, there do not seem to be compelling reasons why this function ought 
not to be carried out by a court in the conventional sense. Concerns about 
security could be met by holding the proceedings in camera and releas-
ing judgments with sensitive parts redacted. Concerns about expertise or 
institutional competence largely ignore the fact that judges are expected to 
be experts in the application of legal principle, not in the core substantive 
matter to which those legal principles are to be applied.
The second element of meaningful review is a detainee’s access to the 
information that is used to ground the decision to hold him in detention. It 
is very simply impossible for an applicant to make any kind of an effective 
argument against liberty deprivation when he is not privy to the evidence 
against him. Of course there will sometimes be security concerns around 
the disclosure of such evidence; that cannot be denied. However, these 
security concerns can be ameliorated in a manner that does not so grossly 
prejudice the entire process against the applicant, as the total non-disclosure 
of evidence does. Provided that the case against the detainee is not based 
entirely or to a decisive degree on evidence that cannot be disclosed to him, 
something akin to a Special Advocates scheme82 can effectively be used in 
 79. This was one of the main motivations for the finding of the Inter-American Court of Hu-
man Rights that habeas corpus and amparo were non-derogable rights. Habeas Corpus 
in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2) and 7(6) American Convention on Human Rights), 
Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 8 (30 Jan. 1987).
 80. These features are extrapolated as the core features of the right to challenge the lawful-
ness of one’s detention as protected by international human rights law. See generally 
de Londras, supra note 7; JAYAWICKRAMA, supra note 36.
 81. Combatant Status Review Tribunals/Administrative Review Board, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE 
(10 Feb. 2009), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/csrtsummary.pdf. 
 82. Special Advocates are government appointed lawyers who represent the interests of 
individuals to whom it has been determined that not all information grounding the state’s 
suspicion can be disclosed. The Special Advocate is intended to protect the interests of 
the individual in question, notwithstanding the fact that s/he may not be able to consult
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this respect. However, it appears that there will be cases where at least the 
thrust of that security-sensitive evidence must be disclosed to the detainee 
in order to facilitate the Special Advocate in effectively putting a case on 
his behalf.83 Again, the point here is merely to demonstrate that security 
concerns are not necessarily insurmountable obstacles to effective process. 
In order for any review process to be meaningful and effective—and to 
reach the standards laid down by international law—it must be adversarial 
and representative.84 All detainees must have legal representation, and that 
representation must include opportunities to meet and consult with one’s 
lawyer in confidence. Again, security concerns can be overcome through 
mechanisms such as the Special Advocate. 
Third, the burden of proof must lie with the government to justify the 
deprivation of liberty that is under review. As a matter of principle this burden 
ought to refer not only to convincing the reviewing body that circumstances 
exist within which the internment system itself is legitimate and permissible; 
the government must also convince the reviewing body that the individual 
detainee is implicated in those circumstances and, having been subjected 
to an evidence-based security assessment, must be detained. This may be 
sufficient for the first review of an individual’s detention, but where (as is 
elaborated on below) an individual is detained for an unlimited/undefined 
number of days it is imperative that the review process would recur on a 
regular basis (such as quarterly) and that, on each review, the standard of 
proof to be met by the government would increase in respect of the individual 
detainee’s case. Thus, in the first review it may be sufficient to establish that 
detention is necessary, but in the next review the government ought to be 
required to establish that detention is necessary, that the information on the 
basis of which this decision was made is not tainted by illegality, and that 
criminal charges are not appropriate. The standard to be met for each of 
these factors should increase as time progresses, and any deference exhib-
   fully (or at all) with the individual detainee. For a historical and comparative consider-
ation of the development of Special Advocates, especially through the intervention of 
the European Court of Human Rights, see David Jenkins, There and Back Again: The 
Strange Journey of Special Advocates and Comparative Law Methodology, 42 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 279 (2011).
 83. A & Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 3455/05, ¶ 220.
 84. Sanchez-Reisse v. Switzerland, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 71 (1986); Toth v. Austria, 14 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 551 (1991); Bousroual v. Algeria, Communication No. 992/2001, adopted 24 April 
2006, UN Doc. CCPR/C/86/D/992/2001 (2006), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/
doc.nsf/0/0aef3b15e0b6c761c125719a00486e57?Opendocument; de Morais v. Angola, 
Communication No. 1128/2002, adopted 18 April 2005, UN Doc. CCPR/C/83/D/2002 
(2005), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/7f6baf300710a4aec125702900
4bcb9d?Opendocument. For an overview of the nature, requirements and status of the 
right to challenge the lawfulness of one’s detention in international human rights law 
see FIONA DE LONDRAS, DETENTION IN THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’: CAN HUMAN RIGHTS FIGHT BACK? 
36-71 (2011). 
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ited to the state’s arguments ought to sharply decrease with the passage of 
time. The burden and standard of proof would therefore occur on a sliding 
scale where there is a correlation between the length of detention and the 
burden of proof (i.e. > time = > proof).
Finally, it is vital that where the court or equivalent body has heard an 
application for review of the lawfulness of one’s detention and has concluded 
that the state was not, in fact, holding that individual in a lawful manner, 
the court would have the power to order release and that court order would 
be enforced. All of the reviews in the world would be meaningless if they 
did not enable someone to secure their liberty. 
By means of example, litigation continues in the United States to secure 
the liberty of detainees in Guantánamo Bay who have been found not to 
be unlawful enemy combatants but who the United States is not prepared 
to return to their home country. Kiyemba v. Obama concerns a number of 
Uighurs who cannot be returned to China and wish to be moved to the 
United States where there is a substantial Uighur community in the Wash-
ington, D.C. area.85 In early 2010 Chief Justice Roberts remanded the case to 
the federal Circuit Court for a consideration of whether the offer to resettle 
the applicants changed the Circuit Court’s previous decision that a judge 
could not order the executive to release detainees into the United States.86 
In 2011 the detainees petitioned the US Supreme Court again, in spite of 
the fact that they had been given a number of resettlement options by the 
government, although none to the mainland United States as they desired. 
Refusing certiorari unanimously in the case, the US Supreme Court held 
that the offers of resettlement were reasonable, that there was no question 
of the detainees being ill-treated in the countries offering them residence 
and, as a result, they would not entertain an attempt to compel the Obama 
Administration to resettle them in the United States itself.87 In this particular 
case, the petitioners were essentially obstructing their own release, but there 
are other cases—especially relating to Yemeni nationals in Guantánamo 
Bay who are deemed eligible for release but who are not being returned 
to Yemen because of the political instability in the country—where release 
has not yet been secured, notwithstanding an acknowledgment that the in-
dividuals ought not to be detained any longer.88 Should it continue to be so 
difficult to effectively secure release, even after a successful habeas corpus 
petition in federal court, this may suggest a somewhat pyrrhic victory for a 
 85. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
 86. Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (per curiam).
 87. Kiyemba v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 1631 (2011), cert denied.
 88. GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT (22 Jan. 2010), available at http://www.justice.
gov/ag/guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf.
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petitioner even if, from a constitutional perspective, Boumediene marked a 
significant high point.89
D. Legitimacy Factor 4: Strict Temporal Limitation
Finally, any system of detention without charge or trial must be subject 
to strict and effective temporal limits. It is important to note that this does 
not mean that the period of individual detention without charge or trial is 
bound to a strictly enforced maximum number of days. Rather, this tem-
poral limitation means that any period of detention without charge of trial 
ought to be strictly limited. It appears that the European Court of Human 
Rights no longer subscribes to the idea that emergencies, including terrorist 
emergencies, are necessarily temporary.90 However, the defense and counter-
terrorism measures required to manage an emergency do not necessarily 
remain stable throughout the entire period of the emergency. Indeed, it 
would most commonly be the case that the severity of the measures required 
decreases with the passage of time from the catastrophic event or series of 
events that would have ushered in the emergency itself.91 Thus, while in-
ternment might be necessary, justifiable, and make sense in the first month 
after the bombing of government buildings, for example, it might no longer 
be justifiable six months afterwards. Thus, when a government convinces 
the public that internment is required, internment should be agreed upon 
for a particular period of time with any renewal once more requiring public 
justificatory deliberation and the burden of proof becoming higher for each 
renewal that may follow. The advantage of this approach is that it compels 
the government to immediately consider what approaches would be best 
regarding detainees: can they be tried, or released, or must they be detained 
on a security assessment even though there may be insufficient evidence (or 
insufficient admissible evidence) for trial? Placing a strict time limit on the 
 89. Keith Ewing has made a similar argument in relation to A & Others v. Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, as the petitioners in that case were rearrested on different 
authority and some now live under very repressive control orders. Keith Ewing, The 
Futility of the Human Rights Act—A Long Footnote, 37 BRACTON L. J. 41 (2005); Keith 
D. Ewing & Joo-Cheong Tham, The Continuing Futility of the Human Rights Act, 2008 
PUB. L. 668.
 90. A & Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 3455/05, ¶ 178.
 91. This is partially because urgency is reduced, meaning that immediate responses can be 
refined to a more sustainable and rights-compliant shape. Although the European Court 
of Human Rights has now held that emergencies need not necessarily be temporary, it 
has held that the duration of the emergency can be taken into account when determining 
the proportionality of a measure under consideration, thus suggesting that the further 
in time from a traumatic event, the less repressive we will expect emergency measures 
to be. A & Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 3455/05, 49 Eur. H. R. Rep. 29 ¶ 178 
(2009).
2011 Can Counter-Terrorist Internment Ever be Legitimate? 615
systemic internment period provides an exogenous motivation for reflection 
and management, combined, of course, with the individual judicial reviews 
of each detainee’s detention.
The idea of a stopwatch on emergency is difficult to impose, although a 
stopwatch on how long one can be detained before being brought before a 
judge or court is entirely plausible and important. Sunset clauses are com-
monly used, which require repressive measures embedded in legislation to 
be reassessed by parliament after a certain period of time and either renewed 
for another limited period or expunged.92 The difficulty with sunset clauses 
historically has been that they simply do not work. Either parliamentarians 
do not turn up and the sunset clause vote is a damp squib that the govern-
ment wins easily, or, even where the vote is contested, a three-line whip is 
imposed and there is no meaningful opportunity to ensure exhaustion of the 
emergency system.93 Therefore, sunset clauses simpliciter are not enough 
within this model of process-based detention without charge; such clauses 
can be effective only if they are the subject of a free, un-whipped vote that 
parliamentarians take seriously. Creating a mechanism by which parliamen-
tary and popular processes can work effectively to insist on justification of 
continued internment by a government is certainly difficult, but if it were to 
be achieved it would at least force the government in question to re-engage 
in public deliberative justification of the system on the expiry of a defined 
and relatively short period of time and create an opportunity for any design 
flaws detracting from legitimacy that have come to light to be tackled. 
What is not proposed here as a definitive legitimacy factor is the require-
ment that an internment system specify the maximum number of days for 
which an individual can be detained without charge or trial. This is excluded 
for three primary reasons. First, the availability of effective judicial review 
on a regular basis with a sliding scale relating to the burden of proof (i.e. > 
time = > proof to justify detention without charge or trial) ought to ensure 
that individuals are not interned for longer (or significantly longer) than can 
be justified. Second, there may be limited cases where, on a balanced and 
rigorous security assessment, individuals pose a real and substantial threat 
to security and cannot be released, but the evidence supporting that assess-
ment is inadmissible, because of illegal acts committed by the holding state 
or by other sources. In such situations it is inconceivable that this individual 
 92. The Joint Committee on Human Rights of the UK Parliament has, for example, noted 
the importance of inserting “proper” sunset clauses in counter-terrorist laws. It defines a 
“proper” sunset clause as “one which provides for statutory provisions to lapse altogether 
after a specified period, requiring the Government to bring forward new primary legisla-
tion to renew the powers”. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS (SIXTEENTH REPORT): ANNUAL RENEWAL OF CONTROL ORDERS LEGISLATION 14 (2010).
 93. de Londras & Davis, supra note 58, at 35.
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would be released and there may be a case for indefinite detention. This, of 
course, is an egregious violation of individual rights and ought only to be 
undertaken or contemplated in the most extreme and exceptional circum-
stances possible. Significantly, if all the legitimacy factors are in fact strictly 
adhered to and bona fide applied, this article contends that there would 
be next to no cases of this nature. In other words, general commitment to 
legitimacy and the rule of law ought to ensure that acts of extreme illegal-
ity (such as interrogative torture) do not occur, evidence is not tainted, and 
people are not interned on the basis of inherently illegitimate techniques 
and consequentially illegitimate security assessments.
E. The Dynamic between the Legitimacy Factors
The legitimacy factors as outlined are interlinked and mutually dependent; 
the exclusion of one factor undermines the remainder. Thus, the envisioned 
dynamic would play out in this way: (1) the government determines that 
internment is required for national security purposes and proposes same 
in public fora including parliament and public debate; (2) the government 
succeeds in justifying the decision and acquiring support; and (3) the system 
is designed taking into account the concerns raised during the debate. The 
system as designed is (1) limited to the degree that is strictly required and 
designed with proportionality principles in mind; (2) introduced for a limited 
period of time although without necessarily limiting the detention period for 
individual detainees, and; (3) designed so that all detention decisions are 
subject to strict judicial review in which factors such as the evidentiary basis 
for the detention and whether the system was applied in a non-discriminatory 
manner to the individual detainee are considered. Once the initial period 
of time for internment has been exhausted (1) the government determines 
whether the internment policy ought to remain in place; (2) the govern-
ment either ends internment or proposes renewal of the system, and; (3) 
if renewal is proposed, the government once more engages in justificatory 
deliberation, at which point the burden of convincing relevant stakeholders 
of the continued need for internment ought to rise because of the temporal 
distance from the event ushering in the internment. 
During internment, all detainees remain capable of applying for strict 
judicial review of their detention with review reoccurring on a regular ba-
sis. The standard for the government to meet in order to satisfy the court 
that continued internment is justified raises as the period of internment 
increases. The model is, therefore, designed to simultaneously recognize 
the reality that internment can be a necessary measure for the purposes 
of counter-terrorism but also that it poses serious difficulties for individual 
rights and the rule of law generally. For it to be legitimate, internment must 
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both be necessary for security and minimally intrusive on individual rights. 
The legitimacy factors proposed here suggest that in fact it may be possible 
for both of these principled requirements to be met, even in the context of 
internment—a national defense and counter-terrorism mechanism that is 
generally considered to be inherently illegitimate.
IV. CONCLUSION
Illegitimacy in internment is not consigned to the pages of history but neither 
is it inevitable. Focusing on legitimacy by means of these four legitimacy 
factors, which cover the different organs of the state (including administra-
tion and law enforcement) and reflect basic rule of law principles may help 
us to emerge from a period of counter-terrorist internment without having 
fundamentally undermined constitutional values. It might also have the more 
practical effect of minimizing backlash and the practical impediments that 
can occur when a state attempts to close down an internment program.94 If 
we assess Guantánamo Bay by reference to the legitimacy factors laid out 
above it is clear that the US policy of detaining suspected terrorists in the 
War on Terrorism has been nothing short of an abject failure. 
The decision to detain in Guantánamo Bay was taken and announced 
at the Executive level without deliberative justification.95 So far only non-
US-citizen Muslims have been detained there,96 and for many years the 
Bush Administration argued that there should be no review by federal 
courts because of Guantánamo’s physical location outside of the territo-
rial United States.97 Even when the Supreme Court held that some kind of 
review process had to be introduced on a statutory basis,98 Congress gave 
legislative force to the Combatant Status Review Tribunals99—a mine field 
 94. In the French-Algerian War, for example, French forces had used such brutality in intern-
ment that some internees were in fact murdered instead of being released. See David P. 
Forsythe, United States Policy toward Enemy Detainees in the “War on Terrorism,” 28 
HUM. RTS. Q. 465, 468-470 (2006), for a thorough account that also maps the lessons 
of that occurrence on to the present day.
 95. JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR 128-164 (2006).
 96. U.S. citizens that had been detained in Guantánamo Bay were moved to mainland 
United States once their citizenship was discovered. For an overview see Jennifer Elsea, 
Detention of American Citizens as Enemy Combatants (2005), available at http://www.
fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31724.pdf. 
 97. For analyses of the approach of the Bush Adminstration see, e.g., Fiona de Londras, 
Guantánamo Bay: Towards Legality?, 71 MOD. L. REV. 36 (2007); K. Elizabeth Dahlstrom, 
Detention and Trial of Foreign Citizens at Guantánamo Bay, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 662 
(2003); David Golove, United States: The Bush Administration’s ‘War on Terrorism’ in 
the Supreme Court, 3 INT’L J.CONST. L. 128 (2005).
 98. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004).
 99. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, supra note 21.
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of process-deficiencies100—and stripped courts of their jurisdiction to hear 
such cases.101 It was not until the summer of 2008, when the US Supreme 
Court took the important step of recognizing that non-US-citizens detained 
in Guantánamo Bay had a constitutional right to habeas corpus or equiva-
lent,102 that the US administration was forced to accept that federal courts 
should have some role in assessing whether or not individuals were lawfully 
detained there.103 Although President Obama signed an Executive Order to 
review Guantánamo Bay and the status of every individual detained there 
on his first day of office in January 2009,104 it is now clear that the detention 
facility will not close in the foreseeable future.105 What remains to be seen is 
whether President Obama’s plans for rejuvenated and more rights-compliant 
military commissions, together with the new system of regular review he is 
introducing in Guantánamo Bay, can succeed in injecting any ex post facto 
legitimacy into the detention regimes there.106 
Primary among the challenges in closing Guantánamo Bay is dealing 
with the cloud of illegitimacy that hangs over the prison camp. What is 
President Obama to do with those who are still detained in Guantánamo 
Bay but who cannot be tried because the evidence against them is tainted by 
torture or other ill-treatment but who, intelligence tells him, pose a real threat 
to the United States?107 The detainees who fall into this grey area between 
“charge” and “release” are perhaps the embodiment of the illegitimacy of 
this detention regime. Although there seems to be only a small number of 
people who can be thus categorized, they force President Obama into a 
situation where he may be required—by both political pressure and a feeling 
of executive responsibility to preserve security—to continue to detain these 
people, albeit in much more comfortable surroundings and with full access 
to counsel, courts, medical professionals, and their families. That eventual-
ity results from the process-phobic approach of the Bush Administration to 
100. Fiona de Londras, What Human Rights Law Could Do: Lamenting the Absence of an 
International Human Rights Law Approach in Boumediene & Al Odah, 41 ISR. L. REV. 
562, 569–72 (2008).
101. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635 (2006).
102. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 795 (2008)
103. For a review of the litigation on Guantánamo Bay and the reactions by the United States 
Congress, see Sarah Hannett, A Tale of Judicial Perseverance: The Restoration of Habeas 
Rights for Guantánamo Detainees, P. L., 2008, at 636.
104. Exec. Order No. 13492, 74 F.R. 4897 (2009), Review and Disposition of Individuals De-
tained at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities, available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ClosureOfGuantanamoDetentionFacilities.
105. Press Release, The White House, Periodic Review of Individuals Detained at Guantá-
namo Bay Naval Station Pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (7 Mar. 
2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/Executive_Order_on_Pe-
riodic_Review.pdf.
106. Id.
107. For a fuller consideration of the future for these detainees see David Jenkins, The Closure 
of Guantánamo Bay: What Next for the Detainees?, P. L., 2010, at 46.
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the question of detention without charge or trial; it reflects the illegitimacy 
of this particular regime of detention without trial, rather than proving the 
general illegitimacy of internment per se.
This article argues that it is possible to sculpt a system of internment 
that has legitimacy. Such a system would be process-based, taking the four 
elements discussed above into full account: public justificatory deliberation, 
non-discrimination, meaningful review, and temporal limitation. It would exist 
in a space of proportionality, reflecting the requirements of both security and 
rights and their coexistence. It would reflect legitimacy in four main ways 
and thereby feed into both narrow (individual process) and broad (general 
principles of accountability, legitimacy, equality, rights protection, and equal 
application of law) conceptions of the rule of law. 
This article contends that process-based design makes legitimacy a result 
of compliance with principles of rule of law rather than with assertions of 
power. In this respect, the design, introduction, and perpetuation of any in-
ternment system that is aligned with the legitimacy factors outlined herein—if 
done wholeheartedly—should ensure that there would be as close as possible 
to no cases where indefinite detention without charge would occur for any 
substantial period of time. Of course, the proposals herein contained are 
advanced from a standpoint of dispassion and without the difficulties, panic, 
fear, and pressure of a proximate terroristic crisis. That a government acting 
in the aftermath of a traumatic terrorist attack and in the midst of a crisis 
would in fact concern itself with questions of legitimacy seems unlikely.108 
What is clear, however, from the first ten years of counter-terrorist internment 
in the “War on Terrorism” and its historical antecedents in Northern Ireland 
and elsewhere, is that if a government hopes that its state will emerge from 
such a crisis with the rule of law as intact as possible, it ought to.
108. On the impact of panic and fear on governmental decision making in times of terroristic 
crisis see FIONA DE LONDRAS, DETENTION IN THE WAR ON TERROR: CAN HUMAN RIGHTS FIGHT BACK? 
8-35 (2011).
